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Summary 
Drawing on interviews with international financial players based in London, New York, Chicago and 
other US financial centres, this paper aims to provide further information and insights into lenders’ and 
investors’ behaviour and their attitudes towards developing countries, and to identify new elements since 
the financial crises of the late 1990s. Aspects to be highlighted include players’ most recent traits, as well 
as trends they are following, in terms of investment strategies, allocation decisions and risk-management 
procedures. The paper ends with policy suggestions on how to encourage international lenders and 
investors to channel a larger proportion of their funds to developing countries. 
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Introduction 
Since the financial crises of the late 1990s capital flows (other than FDI) to developing countries have 
declined dramatically, reaching in aggregate net zero levels in the year 2001, and being just marginally 
positive in 2002.2 For emerging markets, FDI has been the main source of external private capital, 
remaining positive although on a declining trend, whilst bank lending has been negative. An immediate 
question that arises is whether this new trend in flows is temporary or permanent.  
In a recent paper, Griffith-Jones (2002) shed some light on this issue, by trying to identify which 
factors are behind the decline in bank lending and portfolio flows to developing countries. For each type 
of flow, both temporary and permanent factors were identified. The temporary factors included the 
current world recession, an increase in risk aversion by both lenders and investors, and in certain cases 
insufficient demand from developing countries. The permanent (or structural) factors included, in the case 
of banks, a gradual shift from cross-border lending to lending within countries, and in the case of 
portfolio equities, an increasing lack of good investment opportunities (and, in connection with that, lack 
of liquidity) in local stock exchanges.  
If one agrees that developing countries still need to complement their domestic savings with foreign 
capital in order to finance their growth and development needs, the next questions that arise are what can 
be done to reverse the current trends in flows, and more generally, what can be done for these flows to be 
more stable and long term. Recent econometric work shows that, in large part, portfolio flows to 
developing countries are explained by source country factors (FitzGerald and Krolzig 2003). Thus, a 
possible answer to these questions is to propose regulatory changes and incentives in the source countries 
to encourage international financial players to lend to, and invest more in, developing countries. This, of 
course, should be in addition to the establishment of stable macroeconomic and political environments in 
these countries. 
However, in order to propose changes that can effectively alter lenders’ and investors’ behaviour in a 
way that increases capital flow to developing countries, more needs to be known about how these 
financial players act. For example, it is important to understand better how they operate, what factors are 
key in their lending and investment decisions, and what they perceive as obstacles to investing more in 
developing countries.  
In previous work we have already examined this subject (see Griffith-Jones, Gottschalk and Cailloux 
2003 and Griffith-Jones 1998). However, knowledge gaps remain, and the purpose of this paper is to 
move a step further by attempting to fill some of those gaps.   
To that end, this paper takes two steps. First, it reviews the theoretical arguments the business 
literature provides in support of international portfolio diversification and the reasons given to explain 
why diversification is in reality fairly limited. Second, drawing on a series of interviews with financial 
players based in London, New York, Chicago and other smaller US financial centres, we aim to provide 
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further information and insights into lenders’ and investors’ behaviour and their attitudes towards 
developing countries, and to identify new elements since the crises of the late 1990s. 
The paper will thus discuss financial players’ most recent traits, as well as the trends they are 
following, in terms of investment strategies, allocation decisions and risk-management procedures. 
Aspects to be highlighted include the role of information in the investment decision process and the 
barriers (real and perceived) these players face when lending to, and investing in, developing countries.  
Following this introduction, the paper is divided in two main parts. Part I reviews mainly the 
business literature on international portfolio investment decision-making, with reference to the strands of 
the literature that highlight the role of human psychology in explaining why international portfolio 
diversification is not more widespread. It also discusses current risk-management procedures and their 
implications for herding. Part II draws mostly on interview material. It first looks at the broad lending and 
investment strategies that lenders and investors adopt. Second, it discusses in detail how they make their 
main asset allocation decisions, how they manage risk and what models they use. Third, the following 
issues are discussed: investors’ perception of risk since the East Asian crisis, the role of information in the 
different phases of the investment process, factors that may influence herding behaviour, and the 
constraints investors face when investing in both emerging market countries and poor countries. Finally, 
the paper provides a summary of the main findings and tentative policy recommendations to encourage 
more lending and investment in developing countries. 
2 
Part I 
 
1  The business literature 
 
1.1 Why international portfolio investment?3 
The modern portfolio theory asserts that an international portfolio of assets should be preferable over a 
domestic portfolio, because the former can reduce risk through portfolio diversification. International 
portfolio diversification will reduce risk to the extent that the correlation between assets of different 
countries is markedly lower than between assets of the same country.  
Empirical evidence reported by various business finance textbooks shows that stock market prices 
vary far more between countries than they do within a country, thus supporting the notion that cross-
border diversification can result in lower risks than intra-country diversification. The evidence also shows 
that a portfolio that combines bonds and stocks can reduce risks even further, as the correlation between 
stocks and bonds tends to be low.  
Empirical work carried out by IDS international finance team has also shown that, because of their 
low correlation with the assets of developed countries’, the inclusion of developing countries in lenders’ 
and investors’ portfolios of assets, can reduce risks still further and produce long-term rewards. Research 
has been undertaken into this phenomenon with respect to both portfolio equity and debt securities (see 
Kimmis, Gottschalk, Armendariz and Griffith-Jones 2002) and bank lending (see Griffith-Jones, 
Segoviano and Spratt 2002). 
It is true that correlation between the assets of developed and developing countries has gone up 
recently, but it is still lower than correlation among developed countries. Recent evidence shows that 
correlation between US stocks and stocks of other developed countries increased from 0.15 in early 1987 
to nearly 0.8 in 2001 (Hodrick 2001). IDS work, in turn, shows that the correlation of equity asset returns 
among developed countries is higher than that between developed countries and emerging markets over 
the period between 1985 and 2002, and that although both correlations went up over the 1994–2002 
period, the correlation between developed countries and emerging markets was still considerably lower – 
at 0.33 against 0.57 (see Kimmis et al. 2002). Correlation has generally risen because markets are 
increasingly integrated, and are characterised by co-movements of assets. As a result shockwaves are 
transmitted very rapidly across such markets.4 
A further reason in favour of international portfolio diversification would be to outperform the 
world market portfolio. This may be attainable due to the fact that the hypothesis of efficient markets 
does not hold true at the global level. This hypothesis – central to modern financial theory – asserts that, 
                                                          
3  This section mainly reviews the arguments put forward by the business literature, with a focus on portfolio 
equity assets (although references are made to other types of assets); to add a developing country perspective, it 
makes reference to work carried out by IDS as well.  
4  In the case of portfolio equity securities, correlation tends to rise particularly during steep downturns, precisely 
when investors expect low correlation as a hedge against large losses.  
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under efficient markets, prices reflect all relevant past information and are adjusted instantaneously to any 
new and unexpected information. Assuming efficient markets, it would not be possible to outperform a 
given market index. However, international markets seem to be clearly less than efficient, partly because a 
considerable degree of market segmentation still exists at the international level, due to legal restrictions 
and transaction costs. Capital controls (in various forms, though these have been to a large extent 
dismantled worldwide) are a prime example of legal restrictions. Transaction costs are incurred in currency 
exchanges, access to information worldwide, management fees, the provision of custodian services, and so 
forth. 
 
1.2 The degree of international portfolio diversification in reality 
According to Cooper (2001) and Cooper and Kaplanis (1995) the evidence is that portfolios such as UK 
funds or US and German pension funds are highly concentrated in domestic equities. Cooper also reports 
that IMF statistics show foreigners own less than 7 per cent of the US equity market. Below we will also 
see that the share of developing country assets in the total assets of international portfolios is very low, at 
around 2 to 3 per cent. If international portfolio diversification seems so beneficial, the question that thus 
arises is why are portfolios still so little diversified? 
The business literature identifies a number of obstacles to international portfolio investment. These 
include currency risk,5 lack of sufficient information for forecasting and analysis, information 
comparability (for example reports between firms tend to follow different accounting practices), the cost 
of information, cost of international management6 and international custodian costs. 
Still according to the business literature, other factors that discourage international portfolio 
investment or that negatively affect rates of return are associated with the characteristics of stock markets 
across countries, which can be perceived as additional sources of risk. For example, investors are less keen 
on markets that are shallow, lack liquidity and hold a high level of concentration, as such markets would 
be more vulnerable to shocks and manipulative actions. These characteristics are commonly found in the 
stock markets of small and emerging countries. Montiel and Reinhart (2001) have focused on this aspect 
in recent empirical work; interestingly, their econometric results indicate that in fact market features such 
as market capitalisation and the number of listed companies do influence portfolio flows to emerging 
economies.  
Other market characteristics, such as patterns of share ownership and degree of government 
regulations, are also believed to be considered by investors when taking investment decisions. Further 
sources of risk are the multitude of existing financial instruments (each with specific rights and obligations 
which  are  not easy to  quickly  visualise),  commissions and  transaction  costs which  vary  widely  across 
                                                          
5  It is argued, however, that currency risk can be hedged at low cost (see Jorion 1989). 
6  International management can be passive or active. The first type of management refers to building a portfolio 
that is believed to reproduce the performance of an international market index, whereas the second type of 
management seeks to build a superior portfolio through asset allocation and market timing, under the belief 
that markets are not efficient. The latter type of management tends to charge higher fees. 
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markets and tax levels, which can significantly affect returns. The question is whether these sources of risk 
and uncertainty are really important especially for big lenders and investors; it will be seen below that 
some of these factors are indeed relevant in the investment decision-making process of such international 
players. 
Behavioural finance theorists point to the home bias phenomenon to explain why portfolios are so 
little diversified despite the clear benefits of diversification. Home bias means that investors tend to invest 
in assets that are more familiar to them, assets which they feel they know and understand better (Barberis 
2001). Behaviour finance also suggests that investors’ overconfidence can lead to portfolio under-
diversification. For example, an investor may hold just a few stocks, believing that he/she has chosen the 
winners (Gervais and Odean 2001). If factors such as home bias and overconfidence reduce investors’ 
interest in foreign assets, this is likely to apply particularly to investment in developing country assets, 
given investors’ relatively limited knowledge of these. 
A further aspect that may deter diversification is that the risks attached to home and foreign assets 
are assessed differently. As Tucker, Madura and Chiang (1991) discuss in relation to bond returns, bond 
prices (and yield) have the following components: a risk-free interest rate for a free-risk bond, a risk 
premium and an adjustment component. They then report the results of a regression analysis that tests the 
factors that determine the yield differential between a risky bond yield and a free-risk bond yield, first for 
the United States, and then for eight different countries.7 The exogenous variables of the regression are 
employment, change in the stock market index, inflation and variability in the long-term government 
interest rate. The findings indicate that the factors that are important in determination of the yield 
differential in the United States are different from those operating in the other countries. The authors 
conclude that investors’ criteria for determining risk premium vary across countries. This is a hypothesis 
that deserves further investigation. 
Finally, Cooper (2001), focusing on the supply-side constraints to international portfolio 
diversification, observes that many funds prohibit the use of instruments – such as derivative trades – that 
may facilitate international portfolio diversification.8 To this type of restriction, one could add that 
national regulations also sometimes deter funds from investing abroad, for example by ruling that a fund 
should hold a minimum percentage, say, of certain types of domestic equities, or by placing limits on 
holding foreign assets (Davis 2002; see also section 8 of Part II below). A further problem is that fund 
managers have their performance measured by domestic benchmarks. So, even if a manager can diversify 
his or her portfolio internationally, it is still not advisable to stray too far from the domestic benchmark, as 
the penalty for under-performing it would be greater than the loss attached to the missed opportunity of 
outperforming it. 
 
                                                          
7  Based on research conducted by Barret and Kolb (1986), cited by Tucker, Madura and Chiang (1991). 
8  From the developing country perspective, restricting the use of derivatives should be seen as a positive rather 
than a negative trend. See the discussion of bank risk management below.  
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2  Managing the risk of diversified portfolios 
We have seen thus far what rationale the business literature provides in support of international portfolio 
diversification, and the factors that inhibit it. A further issue that the business literature discusses in 
connection with portfolio diversification is the fact that an internationally diversified portfolio requires, 
even more than a domestic portfolio, sophisticated tools (statistical, analytical) to monitor the risk that 
cannot be eliminated through portfolio diversification or that arises from changing circumstances. 
To place risk management into the broader picture of asset portfolio building, it is important to 
mention that much of the risk a fund manager is willing to take (risk tolerance) is influenced by his/her 
investors’ risk preferences (Culp 2001). Fund managers take into account investors’ risk preferences in 
each of a three-stage process: asset allocation, security selection and market timing. Asset allocation refers 
to the broad categories of assets in which to invest; security selection involves choosing assets within each 
category; and market timing relates to the decisions about when it is most appropriate to buy or sell assets.  
It is in the third phase – market timing – that risk management takes place. A technique commonly 
used in risk management is value-at-risk (VAR) analysis. This, along with judgement, guides investors in 
their portfolio management activities. A VAR analysis measures the probability of having a certain 
quantity of earnings at risk. More precisely, it measures the loss probability of a portfolio of assets that will 
be exceeded, say, 1 per cent of a specific time period.9 For that purpose, it estimates the distribution of 
returns of each asset (i.e. their variance) and their covariance, using historical data (Jackson, Maude and 
Perraudin 1998). 
Culp (2001) notes that in its simplest form VAR assumes the hypothesis of normal distributions of 
risks. However, if this hypothesis is not observed, more advanced statistical techniques that allow for 
different types of return distributions can be used within the VAR framework. The problem with these 
alternative techniques is their degree of complexity, which reduces the feasibility of their application. 
Knowledge seems thin on how really important VAR models are in fund managers’ risk assessment 
process, and how much their own judgement is a key input. The degree to which each of these elements 
affects their risk analysis may vary widely across different investors. In Part II we provide information 
based on interviews on whether – and if so, to what extent – lenders and investors rely on VAR models in 
risk management. The use of VAR models may be an important source of volatility of capital flows to 
developing countries and even herding, which is an important concern in this work. Given that and the 
fact that the proposed new Basle Capital Accord (Basle II) wants to encourage banks to adopt such 
models, in what follows we look specifically at their use by banks, for which some empirical evidence has 
been gathered. In addition, we discuss in some depth the role these models may play in exacerbating credit 
crunch, particularly to low-rated borrowers, and contributing to pro-cyclicality of bank lending and 
herding behaviour. 
 
                                                          
9  The loss may be associated with default or with a change in the economic value of the assets. 
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2.1 Banks’ risk management  
A recent assessment of how banks evaluate credit risk has revealed that there is no single model or 
methodology used for that purpose. Instead, banks use different assessment procedures, ranging from 
judgement of expert personnel to the sole reliance on statistical models (Basel 2000).10 However, a gradual 
increase in the use of statistical models to assess risk has been observed. 
A basic approach, believed to have been increasingly adopted by banks and elsewhere, but which our 
interviews do not confirm (see below), has been the VAR analysis.  
In assessing credit risk, banks rely on different types of VAR models.11 The available evidence 
suggests that these models tend to deliver very different results, though these results tend to converge 
when the models are parameterised in a similar fashion (see Jackson, Nickell and Perraudin 1999, based on 
Crouchy and Mark 1998 and Gordy 1998). This may be seen as a problem as it indicates that models are 
not very robust to a change in parameters.12  
Another major problem among the parametric VAR models is that the variables used are assumed to 
be stationary, normally distributed and independent over time. However, these assumptions usually do not 
hold, suggesting that these models might tend to generate biased and even inconsistent estimates. For 
example, in a number of cases the assumption that returns on a given asset have normal distribution is not 
observed in practice. According to Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand (2001) of the LSE Financial Markets 
Group (FMG), these models thus tend to perform poorly in measuring risk.  
One example given by the LSE FMG of poor risk measurement arising from violation of the 
normality assumption is that the principle of sub-additivity is no longer observed. According to this 
principle, the maximum VAR of a portfolio of assets will be determined by the sum of VARs of the 
individual assets comprising that portfolio. But when non-normal distribution is the case, the VAR of a 
portfolio may turn out to be greater than the sum of the VAR of the individual assets, and the latter will 
no longer serve as a reliable indicator of the maximum risk faced by an investor. The authors therefore 
wonder why other, more reliable measures of risk, are not used instead. These shortcomings suggest that 
at least some of the banks (and investment funds) using these models do not assess risk accurately.  
The current Basle II proposal aims to incentivise financial institutions to use these statistical models 
to assess risk and assign ratings for each type of risk for the purpose of capital requirements –  the internal 
ratings-based (IRB) approach. In order to ensure these models can provide more accurate measures of 
                                                          
10  In Basel (2000), basically three approaches to assessing risk and rating borrowers are identified: the ‘statistical-
based process’; the ‘constrained expert judgement-based process’; and the ‘based on expert judgement process’. 
With the first approach, rating assignment is based solely on quantitative tools; with the second approach, 
quantitative tools are used, but the final rating is adjusted by judgement; using the third approach, rating 
assignment is essentially based on expert judgement alone. It is noted that whilst the statistical approach has a 
more prominent role in assigning ratings to small corporates, expert judgement becomes more relevant in large 
corporate lending. 
11  Jackson et al. (1999) identify at least four main types of publicly available models, which have been developed in 
the past few years: the Merton-based models, Ratings-based models, Macroeconomic models and Actuarial 
models.  
12  On that point, see also Danielsson et al. (2001), who tested for the robustness of different models, failing to 
find consistent risk forecasts, for example across different assets and time horizons. 
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risk, the Basle Committee intends to promote common practice in the use of these models, including the 
use of historical data and correct model parameterisation.13 
A number of criticisms have been made in relation to the proposal to encourage banks to rely on 
these models for assessing risk and assigning ratings. At least three negative effects can be identified: 
credit reduction to low-rated borrowers; procyclicality; and more herding.14  
 
Credit reduction to low-rated borrowers 
The proposed regulation can result in credit reduction to low-rated borrowers, partly because of the way it 
has been designed to account for the shortcomings of the statistical model it aims to promote. That is, 
being aware that VAR models lack accuracy, the regulation proposes that banks should incur additional 
capital charges if they do not perform back tests correctly (which is likely, given the complexities involved 
in running the tests), and that a multiplier should be applied to the VAR estimate.15 The latter will 
certainly affect low-rated borrowers disproportionately.  
 
Pro-cyclicality  
As the downturn phase of a business cycle starts, the loss probability estimated by the models will 
increase, and as a result the assets of a portfolio will be downgraded. This phenomenon has been referred 
to as migration. Due to migration, more capital will thus be required, but given that banks would have 
difficulty in raising capital in a context of recession, this may create a credit crunch and thus contribute to 
the further deepening of the downturn of the business cycle. Current estimates indicate that the additional 
capital required in response to portfolio asset migration, would be considerable – in the order of 60 per 
cent, compared with an increase of 7 per cent under the current system. The same sequencing of events 
would take place during the upturn of a business cycle, which could thus cause an excessive, and therefore 
unsustainable, economic boom. 
A key fact underlying the phenomenon of migration is that banks tend to assign ratings using the 
“point-in-time” approach, rather than the “through-the-cycle” approach. Under the “point-in-time” 
approach, borrowers are assigned ratings in the light of their current (or over a specified time-horizon) 
status, whereas the “through-the-cycle” approach takes into account borrower status over the whole 
business cycle, including the worst scenario. Thus, whilst under the former approach ratings change as 
conditions change during the business cycle, under the latter approach ratings remain the same. A survey 
of bank practices carried out by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (see Basel 2000) reports 
ambiguous findings regarding which approach financial institutions adopt. A member of the Basel 
committee, however, expressed quite forcefully the view that banks indeed adopt the “point-in-time” 
                                                          
13  The latter includes the time horizon to be used. 
14  For a comprehensive critique of the current Basle II proposal, see Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001). 
15  The proposal requires capital to be equivalent to the highest of either the current VAR measurement or the 
average VAR estimate over the preceding 60 days, multiplied by three (Jackson et al. 1998: 10). 
8 
approach and seem strongly opposed to changing this practice.16 This point is important because the use 
of the “through-the-cycle” approach could quite significantly reduce the pro-cyclicality of lending. 
 
Herding  
Herding behaviour could be encouraged through the dissemination of VAR techniques among financial 
institutions and the homogenisation of procedures accompanying the use of these techniques. This is 
because, as these institutions increasingly start to rely on the same methods to assess risk, they will tend to 
behave similarly at times of increased risk, and the herding that already occurs during periods of euphoria 
and crises would be intensified (this is a hypothesis discussed in more detail in Part II). As the LSE 
Financial Markets Group (FMG) puts it in its comments to the current Basle proposal ‘[o]f special 
concern is how the proposed regulations would induce the harmonisation of investment decisions during 
crises with the consequence of destabilising the global financial system’ (Danielsson et al. 2001: 3). 
Persaud (2000) provides a very compelling example of how the use of statistical models to manage 
risk can increase herding. Using historical data on return volatility and correlation, banks first estimate the 
distribution of future returns. They next calculate the daily earnings at risk (DEAR) – how much they 
expect to lose the next day with, say, 1 per cent probability. They then impose a limit on what they are 
prepared to lose. As volatility and correlation of returns of specific assets increase, the DEAR of those 
banks with higher exposure to those assets increase and eventually hits their loss limits. This event will 
induce the banks to sell these volatile assets, which will further reduce their value and increase volatility. 
This will in turn make the DEAR of banks less exposed to these assets to also hit their limits, thus igniting 
a second wave of selling, which will just reinforce the falls and so encourage further selling. 
Thus, the actions of one bank based on its DEAR analysis end up contaminating the DEAR of other 
banks and therefore their actions. If herding already occurs because lenders and investors have a tendency 
to mimic other agents’ actions, such behaviour could be intensified, particularly in times of crisis, if all 
agents adopt similar models. Persaud believes that the practice of DEAR limits largely explains the 
numerous financial crises that characterised the 1990s. Thus, a major problem with the current regulatory 
proposal is that it will encourage further convergence in behaviour which may in turn intensify herding 
and thus lead to increased systemic risks. Developing countries would be particularly affected by these 
developments.  
Following the same reasoning, Danielsson et al. (2001) of the LSE FMG have stressed the potentially 
destabilising role of VAR models and how they can contribute to crashes. This is because, as is suggested 
in Persaud’s example, volatility – and therefore risk – is an endogenous process, affected by the interaction 
between players, rather than exogenous as usually assumed by the models. Danielsson et al. further argue 
that in times of crisis, these models become strongly impaired in their ability to predict risk accurately. As 
players unify their strategies, the data that reflects this process suffers a structural break, and can no longer 
be relied upon by the models.  
                                                          
16  Interview material. 
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The LSE FMG has recently carried out research that provides empirical evidence relating to some of 
these issues. For example, the hypothesis that similar behaviour patterns among lenders and investors can 
aggravate a crisis is tested in Danielsson and Zigrand (2001) and Danielsson et al. (2001). Their findings 
are that herding causes the value of a particular asset to fall sharply and liquidity to dry up – events likely 
to lead to market collapse. It is important to note at this point that, as similar techniques are adopted by all 
actors, the intensification of herding would not be restricted to one group of actors (e.g. banks) but would 
extend to all of them.  
 
3  The role of human psychology in determining herding 
A key issue to be addressed in the context of this discussion is that herding in financial markets has been 
prevalent since long before statistical models were created. Moreover, herding is such a prominent feature 
during euphoria and crises that one should question whether using statistical models in risk management 
can possibly have any further negative impact at all.  
The two most common explanations for herding have been investors’ impulse to exploit other 
investors’ information implied in their trading actions, and the fact that investors prefer to lose together 
with their peers than to lose alone (due to peer pressure, prestige, performance criteria, the fact that it 
would more likely for them to be bailed out, etc.). 
The behavioural finance theory has in turn highlighted psychological features of human behaviour 
that can also contribute to herding. An example is overconfidence. Empirical research suggests that 
individuals tend to be overconfident in their ability to predict events. This overconfidence arises from 
their perception that their successes are due to their own skills, and failures to bad luck.   
Interestingly, overconfidence in the ability to predict events may be most strongly manifested during 
times of euphoria, when uncertainty about the future dissipates and gives way to bold predictions 
(Bernstein 1998). Thus, euphoria may simultaneously stimulate overconfidence and market euphoria. 
Moreover, as Gervais and Odean (2001) point out, even if an investor realises that other investors are 
overconfident and thus driving prices too high, they may still be discouraged from taking short positions 
on the basis that prices may increase even further.  
It is also believed that as investors start comparing their predictions with actual outcomes, they 
become more realistic over time. However, even so, new, inexperienced and overconfident investors 
lacking the judgement of more established investors enter the markets, perpetuating overconfidence. 
Another human characteristic that can fuel a financial boom is the tendency to categorise simple 
events, or see them as representing a broader phenomenon. This characteristic, known as 
representativeness, may result in investment errors when events do not actually represent what they at first 
seem to (Barberis 2001). In financial markets, a classical case is when investors see patterns in events that 
are just random. That is, investors commonly see trends in random walks, or expect events that are 
actually short-term to persist in the long term (Shiller 2001). These perceptions may translate into actions 
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that feed booms or crises. For example, financial market players invest in stocks that are going up in the 
short run, thus sustaining their growth for a while until, eventually, prices collapse. 
Shiller (2001) also highlights other human characteristics, believed to underpin booms and busts. 
These include excessive optimism, trust in others’ judgement, conformity pressures (i.e. tendency to 
follow group behaviour in order to maintain status), pressures (from clients, or committees) to follow 
fads, and the reliance on popular theories that actually lack substance. Finally, Shiller also highlights the 
role of institutional and social phenomena. Examples of these include: the prudent person standard, 
according to which a person should invest “according to conventional wisdom”, or “in a way seen as 
prudent”; and the media, which, by producing a well-written story, “can have powerful impact on public 
thinking”. 
 
4  Conclusions 
We have seen that the business literature puts forward two main arguments in favour of international 
portfolio diversification – risk reduction (due to the relatively low degree of correlation between assets 
across countries) and the possibility of outperforming world markets given that the latter are less than 
efficient. On these two accounts, diversification towards developing countries would be even more 
justified, as asset correlation between developed and developing countries is still relatively low, and market 
failures, which lead to lack of efficiency, are even more acute in developing countries than in the world as 
a whole.  
However, we have also seen that investors face a number of constraints in investing internationally, 
and in particular, in developing countries. These constraints are related to host country factors and supply-
side factors. The latter factors, which are the main concern of this study, include home bias and 
overconfidence, the use of domestic benchmarks and the fact that these are used for performance 
assessment, and restrictions of different sorts, ranging from the use of derivatives to national regulations 
biased towards home assets. 
With respect to home bias and overconfidence, a possible policy response would be to educate 
investors about the advantages of investing in developing countries and work towards providing better 
and less costly access to information relating to these countries. However, such a course of action, 
although important, may not be sufficient. For such barriers to be significantly reduced, regulatory 
incentives would have to be provided. These could take the form of tax incentives for example, and could 
be justified on the grounds that they were dealing with international market failures. As regards the use of 
benchmarks and performance assessment, regulators could encourage the markets to change the criteria 
and time period used to assess investors’ performance. And national regulations that restrict investment 
abroad, where these are still in place, could be relaxed or totally removed. 
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Policy responses to some of the other restrictions should be considered with care, as their removal 
could have a negative rather than a positive effect on developing countries. For example, allowing 
investors to use derivatives freely could exacerbate financial volatility in the economies of developing 
countries, as discussed below.  
To the extent that portfolio diversification towards developing countries is encouraged, an issue that 
should be addressed concerns the use of more sophisticated techniques to manage the complexity of and 
risks associated with international portfolio diversification. A particular risk-management technique 
currently promoted by regulators are the VAR models. The more widespread use of these models would 
reduce the divergence that still exists today in the selection of risk-management models – by banks and 
investors – as confirmed below. These models are parameterised differently and thus deliver different 
results. As is argued by Persaud (2000) and the LSE Financial Markets Group, from the perspective of 
financial stability and of developing countries, the use of different criteria should not be discouraged, since 
it has the benefit of reducing the likelihood of polarisation of positions. Promoting similar statistical 
models for risk assessment would increase convergence in behaviour, with the possible undesirable effect 
of increasing herding. Moreover, such a convergence would increasingly rely on statistical models whose 
ability to assess risk, already poor in normal times, tends to collapse in times of crisis.  
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Part II 
Part I of this paper discussed the rationale behind international portfolio diversification, and the 
constraints lenders and investors face when investing internationally and in particular in developing 
countries. With respect to constraints, both host country and source country factors were identified. A key 
factor constraining lending to and investment in developing countries is the availability, cost and 
comparability of information. A possible policy recommendation is to increase the flow of information 
about developing countries to international lenders and investors. However, while there seem to be clear 
benefits associated with the provision of information, in the second part of the paper we ask how 
information is fed into the portfolio allocation process, how beneficial it is in reality and what the 
associated costs are likely to be. More generally, the second part of the paper identifies new constraints 
facing international lenders and investors looking to operate in developing countries, in particular those 
constraints that emerged after the financial crises of the late 1990s. 
Part I of the paper also discussed the adoption of VAR techniques to manage portfolio risk. It was 
pointed out that the increasing use of VAR models among international lenders and investors could 
exacerbate herding behaviour. However, as noted earlier, herding in financial markets has been prevalent 
since long before statistical models were created. So what other factors are behind herding? Could the 
generalised use of such models really increase volatility and herding? Would capital flows to developing 
countries become more volatile as a result, thereby reducing the promised benefits such flows are 
expected to bring to these countries? How important are these techniques really in fund managers’ risk 
assessment processes today? How much is their own judgement a key input and how receptive they are to 
the idea of adopting VAR? What other arguments are put forward in favour of diversification in the use of 
risk-management techniques? What can regulators do in this respect?  
To throw additional light on these and related issues, this part of the paper provides further 
information on, and insights into, lenders’ and investors’ behaviour. It takes a broader perspective by 
examining the following issues: investment (and lending) strategies of different financial actors; allocation 
decisions, with a discussion of the three-stage process that characterises such decisions; the degree of risk 
aversion by lenders and investors; the role of information; herding behaviour; and constraints on investing 
in developing countries. It draws mostly on interviews with different financial players, including fund 
managers, pension funds and bankers, based in London, New York, Chicago and other smaller US 
financial centres.17  
 
5  Investment (and lending) strategies 
It is a common view that the greater majority of investors do not attempt to attain an absolute level of 
performance, but a relative one, by comparing their performance with a chosen market index, which is 
used as a benchmark.  
                                                          
17  The list of interviewees can be found in Appendix I. 
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Yet, investors that follow benchmarks can be active or passive. Passive investors attempt to match 
the market portfolio performance. Active investors, on the other hand, try to outperform market indices; 
they may adopt specific investment strategies, associated with different categories of assets. These 
strategies may be labelled in a number of ways, such as growth, momentum, and contrarian strategies.18 
Active investors may also adopt a combination of investment strategies and rely on historical returns as a 
guide in their investment decisions. 
A number of reasons have been brought forward to explain why investment management funds 
adopt particular investment strategies. These can be associated with legal constraints, their liability 
structure, the mandates they receive from their client base and the pool of skills they hold. In what follows 
we will be looking at the investment strategies of investment management funds and pension funds. In 
addition, we will also discuss the lending strategies international banks are adopting towards developing 
countries. As regards investment and pension funds, it will be seen that global funds tend to adopt 
momentum strategies (“buying the winners and selling the losers”), whereas dedicated funds, along with 
pension funds, have more scope for investing long term. To the extent that funds dedicated to emerging 
markets are disappearing, this would clearly have a negative impact on developing countries, as the result 
would be a predominance of funds with a more volatile behaviour investing in such countries. 
 
5.1 Investment management funds 
Investment management funds adopt investment strategies set by the decision-making body of the firm. 
The decision-making body (or structure) is fairly complex in most cases, differing widely between funds. 
Some have committees, made up of people with different expertise (can be financial market professionals, 
lawyers, academics), while others hold less formal consultative groups, in some cases formed by (in-house 
or sub-contracted) country teams, and in others by corporate analysts specialised in specific sectors that 
cut across countries. A key component of this overall structure is their client base, which is usually broad, 
and includes pension funds and other institutional clients, charities and retail. As will be seen below, 
clients can play an important role in setting the guidelines governing how fund managers should invest. 
Investment funds manage different sorts of asset portfolios. Broadly, these can be opportunistic (or 
crossover) and specialised portfolios. Crossover portfolios usually cover a wide range of asset categories, 
which may include the emerging markets as a specific asset category. Specialised portfolios, on the other 
hand, are focused on specific asset categories. Of interest here are the dedicated emerging markets 
portfolios, which can be global, regional or country-based.  
                                                          
18  Dimson, Nagel and Quigley (2001) have identified a number of different investment strategies, each of which is 
associated with a specific asset category. These include: value (assets with a low ratio of market to book price); 
growth (assets with a high ratio of market to book price); momentum (stocks that have performed very well in 
the recent past); contrarian (stocks that have performed poorly in the recent past, but which are expected to 
perform better over the long term); small-caps (companies with small market capitalisations) and large-caps (big 
companies, known as blue chips). 
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Within these broad categories (of crossover and specialised funds), it is possible to identify the 
following: benchmark funds, which tend to be the majority, and total return funds.  
Benchmark funds are often (though not always) informed by clear mandates established by clients, 
who set the targets to be achieved. The degrees of freedom funds have to manage assets vary, however. 
For example, managed balanced funds are given a specific peer group benchmark fund to beat, but have 
freedom (though the degrees vary from fund to fund) to take general asset allocation decisions. In other 
cases, clients specify that a specific benchmark (peer group, index) should be beaten, and set the guidelines 
on how general asset allocation should be. Clients may also impose restrictions on specific asset categories 
(e.g. derivative instruments, countries, level of liquidity or maturity, etc.). Within these general guidelines 
set by the client, a fund manager has some freedom to take allocation decisions, and deviate from the 
benchmark the client sets (tracking error). This is exercised with caution, however. As recent events have 
shown, the fund manager can be sued if he or she underperforms.19  
Passive funds, in turn, just track an index, with little or no room for asset management.20 
Finally, total return funds do not follow a benchmark; they may be small but very active, they may act 
globally and deal with emerging markets. Although some market participants associate total return funds 
with crossover funds, this may not necessarily be the case. Dedicated funds can also adopt total return 
strategies, with the possibility of acting as contrarians by holding value assets for long periods of time.  
In principle, one may expect total return funds to be more volatile than benchmark funds, because 
these funds face fewer constraints. However, this may not necessarily be so. A fund manager could argue 
that actively following or trying to beat a benchmark may result in too high a turnover and, therefore, 
higher volatility, than searching for total return. The latter strategy may allow an investor to hold an asset 
until it matures (thus acting as a contrarian), and, as a consequence, be less volatile. What emerged from 
the interviews is that those funds less attached to benchmarks claim to invest more long term, and that it 
is the objective to invest long term, reflecting the clients’ preferences, that influences the investment 
strategy, rather than the other way round. 
The issue of volatility is more commonly raised regarding global investment funds versus dedicated 
emerging market funds. According to a market participant, the latter may be seen as more long term, for 
having more long-term liabilities and for being more committed to value assets. In addition, they invest 
more  in  information  and  thus  have  more  knowledge  about  their  asset  holdings   (i.e.  information 
                                                          
19  See, for example, the Unilever-Merrill Lynch case, in which the Unilever Superannuation Fund sued Merrill 
Lynch Investment Managers (MLIM) for underperforming an agreed benchmark index by 10.5 per cent in one 
specific year, when the downside threshold specified in the contract was no more than 3 per cent (Financial 
Times, ‘Merrill faces payout to avoid court action’, 8 October 2001: 29). 
20  Today, more than 30 per cent of US institutional investors have their assets managed by funds that track 
indices, while in the UK this figure is around 20–25 per cent. On the other hand, retail investors worldwide 
have only about 3 per cent of their assets managed by index funds (see Skorecki, A. 2002 ‘Trade plays active 
role in passive investing’, Financial Times Fund Management Supplement, 29 April: 3). 
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advantage). This gives them more confidence about their actions, and reduces the need to follow herds. 
Dedicated emerging market funds, however, are visibly declining in number, with investments in emerging 
markets being increasingly made by global funds.  
Our interviews also revealed that an investment house operating globally on both sides of the 
Atlantic has been pursuing quite dissimilar investment strategies in its different investment divisions. For 
example, a division working mainly with bonds, and managing both global and dedicated emerging market 
portfolios, essentially follows benchmarks, with performance being assessed (informally) on a daily basis, 
with a yearly average turnover between 200 and 300 per cent. At the same time, another division dedicated 
to emerging market equities adopts an active strategy that does not follow benchmarks. Their view is that 
‘benchmarks change and following a benchmark would, therefore, imply too high a turnover’. They prefer 
to invest long term, with rolling periods from three to five years (average annual turnover between 20 and 
30 per cent). This shows that different investment cultures can be found in the same investment house, a 
phenomenon that could be explained by mergers of hitherto independent investment firms operating in 
different segments of the market. 
More generally, some investment houses – whether managing global or dedicated portfolios – are 
more aggressive than others in their asset allocation decisions (and are therefore more short term), thus 
taking the initiative of switching asset allocation and “being at the forefront of the herd”. Other players 
tend to be more conservative, and act cautiously particularly with respect to emerging markets, being 
relatively more careful in moving away from a neutral position, as they perceive higher risks involved. 
(The neutral position regarding emerging markets is in most cases around 2 to 3 per cent, within a range 
of 0 to 5 per cent. – see below).  
Other characteristics shared by investment funds can be summarised as follows. Their portfolio of 
assets may comprise bonds (sovereign, corporate), equities, property and cash. Performance is often 
assessed on a quarterly basis (though this may vary – some assess their performance on a daily basis, as 
mentioned above). Turnover varies widely across investment funds; in a few cases the average annual 
turnover is between 20 and 30 per cent, while in others it may be around 300 per cent, or even higher. The 
horizon for holding an asset may be six to nine months amongst momentum investors and three to five 
years amongst contrarians. Funds operate with different vehicles, which can be pooled (open-ended, close 
end) or segregated (individual). Table 5.1 summarises some of the points made above for different types 
of fund. 
 
5.2 Pension funds 
As with investment management funds, the decision-making structure of pension funds is fairly complex. 
But it differs from other funds in a fundamental way: it is the trustees21 who are charged with determining 
the overall asset allocation of a pension fund. However, because they lack sufficient expertise, and, even 
more important, because they may face legal responsibility  for their actions,  having to respond  with their 
                                                          
21  Trustees can act like a corporate board, but they represent the clients of the fund (interview material). 
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personal assets in order to protect themselves, they rely heavily on the advice of consultants, who 
ultimately set overall asset allocation.22 This is particularly true in the Anglo-American world. On the 
Continent, trustees are absolved of personal responsibility, and are therefore less in need of advice from 
consultants. 
 
Table 5.1 Main features of different types of fund 
Fund type Main features Risk 
 
 
Total returns 
Often small and very active; generally they are crossover, but 
can also be dedicated. The latter can draw on detailed 
information provided by their own research departments, and 
tend to adopt a bottom-up approach in their allocation 
decisions. 
Room for acting as contrarians, with relatively low turnover, 
though they can be very aggressive as well.  
Risk takers 
 
Peer group 
benchmark 
(balanced 
funds) 
Clients specify the benchmark to follow, but the fund 
manager has degrees of freedom (though these vary) to take 
general asset allocation decisions. 
 
Risk 
neutral 
 
Index 
benchmark 
They can be specialised in different categories of assets, 
including emerging markets (EMs). 
Have clear mandates; try to outperform the index 
benchmark, by having tracking-error targets; this may lead 
to high turnover and volatility. Managers may deviate from 
benchmarks, but not excessively. 
Risk 
cautious 
 
 
Bench-
mark 
funds 
Index tracking Mimics a chosen index; can be very volatile.  Risk 
averse 
 
Source: interview material. Shaded areas: passive funds. 
 
In countries like the UK and the US, consultants play a major role not only in asset allocation, but also in 
manager selection (though in the US there has been a gradual shift towards defined contribution schemes 
in which individual investors have a bigger say in investment decisions). More specifically, consultants take 
decisions on how to allocate funds between different assets (e.g. equities, bonds), and how to distribute 
them geographically. Also, they choose which investment fund manager to hire, and which mandates to 
give them.23 Finally, consultants choose the benchmarks the fund manager should follow for bonds and 
equities. 
There are instances, however, of pension funds that act more independently, with much less reliance 
on the advice of consultants. For example, one major UK pension fund has an investment committee 
(formed by financial professionals and other experts) that advises the trustees on how to allocate their 
fund across different assets and countries. Moreover, the committee gives advice on which fund managers 
                                                          
22  Trustees’ reliance on consultants is an aspect of the decision-making structure of pension funds strongly 
emphasised in the Myners report (2001). The report points to trustees’ lack of expertise as the main reason for 
this reliance. 
23  According to some of our interviewees, in the US mandates tend to be global, whilst in the EU they are 
becoming increasingly specialised (e.g. global equity mandate, emerging market equity mandate, etc.). 
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to hire to run the funds, and which investment strategy each fund manager should follow. They still have 
consultants, but do not rely heavily on them. It is not clear, though, how trustees would, in this case, 
protect themselves against hostile litigation, to which they would have to respond with their personal 
assets. Asked this question, an investment manager of a fund operating in this way answered that their 
long-term liabilities permit them to be more long term and take risks, and even to underperform, and that 
their clients should accept this. 
It can be seen from the above that, on the whole, the investment strategy a pension fund chooses is 
largely determined by its consultants, who tell them where and how to invest. In the UK, a few large 
consultancy firms dominate the market. As a consequence, pension funds follow similar advice and 
investment patterns, resulting in limited diversification. An observed characteristic of their investment 
pattern is the small proportion of developing country assets in their overall portfolio of assets (see below). 
Given pension fund long-term liabilities, one would expect the establishment of long-term portfolios. 
However, like other types of investors, their fund managers are locked into a system of short-term 
performance assessment, which operates as a major constraint to more long-term asset holding. The 
recent trend amongst pension funds from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes is giving more 
power to individual investors. They have, however, acted rather conservatively in their investment 
decisions, partly because risks are not pooled (Myners 2001). According to a consultant, it is important 
that they become more informed and educated in order to be able to take on more long-term investment 
strategies. Also, it is important that they learn about the benefits of portfolio diversification and in 
particular of investing in developing countries. 
 
5.3 Banks 
Bank lending strategies have been changing in important ways in the past few years. They are moving 
gradually from cross-border lending to within-country lending in developing countries (Lubin 2001). This 
has implied a substitution of domestic lending for foreign lending. According to some figures provided in 
Hawkins (2001), whilst net foreign lending to developing countries has declined dramatically in the past 
few years, becoming net negative, within-country lending has almost doubled over the same time period.24 
To the extent that developing countries permit foreign ownership of their local banks, and that, as a 
result, foreign banks take them over, it would be natural to expect an increase in their on-shore exposure. 
However, given the decline in foreign lending at the same time that in-country lending has increased, we 
wonder whether these two trends are inter-connected. Some market participants argue that they are not, 
and that actually cross-border lending by a bank may be facilitated by the presence of affiliates in that 
country, as ‘the affiliates have the advantage of knowing the country better’. Thus, one type of lending 
would complement, rather than replace, the other. 
                                                          
24  Between June 1998 and December 2000, international bank loans by subsidiaries in local currency to local 
residents increased 75 per cent (see Hawkins 2001, Table 8). 
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Intra-country lending has been based on local deposits, which are being used mainly to provide 
personal financial services. At the same time, there is a tendency to withdraw from corporate lending in 
developing countries. The alleged reason for that is ‘they do not get the same returns as in the past’. Also, 
they do not get paid in crises.  
Banks, of course, still provide foreign lending to developing countries, but not long-term lending, as 
was the case in the past, especially during the 1970s. Today this lending is short-term (even so, in net 
terms such lending is negative for many developing countries). They lend to the big domestic banks, as 
these are believed to be too big for the government to let them fail when a major crisis hits. Long-term 
loans are becoming rare. The risks involved are perceived as too high. Long-term debt, in the form of 
bonds, through the trading desk, could be an alternative. But, again, according to one of our interviewees, 
bonds are seen as ‘too risky and extremely volatile’. 
 
6  Allocation decisions 
As seen earlier, investment funds take into account investors’ risk preference over each of a three-stage 
process: asset allocation, security selection and market timing. In this section we will see how investors 
and lenders allocate their assets and undertake security selection. Market timing will be discussed in the 
section on risk management. 
 
6.1 Asset allocation 
As with the fund investment strategy, the general guidelines on how to allocate funds across different 
asset classes are set by a decision-making body (or structure).  
In the case of pension funds – and the same applies to investment funds that have pension funds as 
their main clients – the pension fund consultants set the general guidelines governing asset allocation. For 
that purpose, they use the asset-liability match (ALM) approach. They take into account their clients’ 
preferences and characteristics. For clients such as mature pension funds, which tend to be more averse to 
risk, they normally recommend holding fewer equities (and less emerging market assets). Younger funds 
with more cash flow are given the flexibility to invest more in value assets, with capitalisation gains 
expected to be reaped in the long term (over 10 years).  
The Myners report clearly notes, however, that a majority of pension funds still outsource 
management functions to their fund managers. For example, most fund managers of peer group 
benchmark funds retain the authority (though to varying degrees) to take general asset allocation 
decisions. According to the report, of a sample of 275 UK pension funds managing £407 billion of assets 
(taken for the year 1999), 191 were classified as some sort of peer group benchmark fund. Although they 
are the majority, their numbers have declined steadily in the past several years (see Myners 2001: 54, 
Figure 3.2). 
Asset allocation patterns seem to vary considerably across investment and pension funds. For 
example, a big UK-based investment fund (with pension funds amongst its clients) has informed us that it 
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allocates 50 per cent of its funds to bonds, 30 per cent to equities and 20 per cent to properties. In 
contrast, a major UK pension fund invests around 75 to 80 per cent in equities, 5 to 10 per cent in bonds, 
10 per cent in properties and 0 to 5 per cent in cash. The latter roughly reflects how UK funds build the 
asset portfolios of their pension fund clients. According to a survey from Russell Mellon Caps, in 2001 
balanced funds’ asset portfolios consisted of 80.3 per cent equities, 13.6 per cent bonds and 4.7 per cent 
cash.25 The current market trend is to gradually switch from equities to bonds, as the latter outperformed 
the former over the past five years. More recently, this move from equities to bonds has also been in 
response to the steep fall in equity prices. However, as hinted earlier, it is not unusual for relatively young 
pension funds to stick with the strategy of investing mainly in equities rather than bonds. 
For our purposes, an initial important question is to ask what proportion of total assets held by 
investment (and pension) funds is represented by emerging market assets. For this asset category, figures 
seem to converge. Global investment funds and pension funds based in the UK claim that of their total 
asset portfolio, only around 2 to 3 per cent are emerging market assets.26 Before the Asian crisis, emerging 
market asset shares in total assets were higher, having reached 5 per cent, but have declined to the current 
levels since then. For certain funds, levels have declined even further, to around 1 per cent or less. 
According to fund managers, today there are no lower limits in terms of emerging market assets, while 
upper limits tend to be around 5 per cent.  
A second, and more important, question to address is why so little – around 2 to 3 per cent – is 
allocated to emerging markets. This question is a crucial one in view of the promised benefits of 
international portfolio diversification, as discussed above. According to a fund manager who mainly has 
pension funds in his portfolio of clients, consultants adopt a mathematical model to allocate assets, and 
they look at aspects such as inherent return and risk characteristics; this could explain lack of investment 
in emerging markets.  
However, the use of models in the allocation process is not sufficient to explain why different funds 
converge in the proportion of emerging market (EM) assets they hold. It seems that not technical, but 
other reasons better explain the current levels of asset allocation to EMs, in addition to a variety of more 
general obstacles faced by investors operating in developing countries (see below). For example, these 
funds started investing in EMs in the late 1980s and early 1990s from near zero levels, and from then on 
gradually increased the share of EM assets in their total asset portfolio until this trend was interrupted 
(and somewhat reversed) by the East Asian crisis.  
 
                                                          
25  Information taken from Budden, R. ‘Second poor  year in row for fund managers’, Financial Times, 23 January 
2002. 
26  Information based on interviews; FitzGerald and Cobham (2002); Trustnet (www.trustnet.com). 
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6.2 Security selection 
This sub-section will focus on security selection by investment (and pension) funds in regard to the 
emerging market asset class. We will first look at the types of assets they choose to hold and, second, at 
the geographical distribution of such assets. 
With respect to types of assets, funds hold emerging market assets mainly in the form of bonds 
(sovereign and corporate) and equities. Some funds split their emerging market assets evenly between 
bonds and equities, while others are skewed strongly towards either of these two asset categories. Whether 
to hold more of one type of asset than another depends on a variety of factors. These include their 
investment strategies (e.g. preference for value or growth assets), the expected returns on each type of 
asset, risks involved (including exchange risk), degree of liquidity, whether their liabilities permit them to 
hold long term, and on which asset category they have more accumulated expertise. 
To illustrate some of these points, in the case of bonds, since the Asian crisis some fund managers 
have searched for greater safety and, therefore, have strongly skewed their holdings towards sovereign 
bonds as opposed to corporate emerging market bonds. Corporate bonds are viewed with caution. 
Investors are prepared to acquire corporate emerging market debt only if the issuers are of high quality, 
and with dollar or euro earnings. The flight to safety is a phenomenon that always follows every crisis.  
Regarding the choice between equities and bonds, another fund manager, when asked to explain his 
fund’s preference for emerging market equities, cited accumulated expertise in equities (and insufficient 
knowledge of bonds), and the fact that equities have ‘a built-in protection against currency devaluation’, as 
devaluation can lead to improved performance. Of course, such a preference for equities should not be 
taken to be widespread among investors, as capital flows to developing countries have gone mostly to 
bonds rather than equities. 
As regards geographical asset allocation by funds (and by banks) in emerging markets, investment 
(and pension) funds adopt different strategies, and rely on very specific decision-making structures for 
that purpose. Some funds adopt a top-down approach and others a bottom-up approach. The top-down 
approach initially involves setting overall allocation across different asset categories. Next, limits for 
emerging markets may be set, first on a regional basis, then once EM countries within each region are 
chosen, further limits are set for each country. Some investors do not categorise EM countries on a 
regional basis, but by economic characteristics instead (e.g. whether they are oil-exporting or oil-importing 
countries). Others, like the banks we interviewed, do not impose overall regional limits, but set them 
country by country. According to one bank, however, limits can be set according to loan maturity (that is, 
the greater the maturity, the lower the limit).  
The bottom-up approach means, in the words of a fund manager who adopts this approach, looking 
at the company with little regard to the country information. This approach might imply more stable flows 
to developing countries, as the investor is less inclined to react to changes in a country’s circumstances. 
This approach seems rather unusual, however. It is more common for investors to look primarily at the 
country level, setting country limits (although some do not), and to look at the economic fundamentals. In 
addition, in their allocation process, they look at returns, risk and liquidity. To the extent that the bottom-
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up approach implies more stable flows than are offered by other approaches, it would be advisable to 
provide more information at the micro/sectoral level to encourage investors to adopt such an approach. 
Common to all funds are the constraints they face, such as concentration limits. For example, the top 
five stocks cannot be more than 40 per cent of the total portfolio, and no single stock can be more than 
10 per cent of the total portfolio. These limits, which are imposed by the Institut Monetaire de 
Luxembourg (IML), make funds underperform, as they cannot hold much of a big EM company’s asset 
that has done well.  
 
7  Risk management and the use of models 
Once a portfolio is built, investors start managing risk, an activity that essentially requires the ability to 
recognise the best time to buy and sell assets. For the purpose of risk management, a well-known 
technique is the value-at-risk (VAR) model, as discussed earlier. VAR can have a critical role in asset 
changes in response to changing circumstances. The current Basle II proposal aims to incentivise banks 
(and other financial institutions) to use VAR models to assess risk (see discussion above). This initiative 
seems to reflect a belief by regulators that markets are increasingly adopting VAR analysis in their risk-
management activities, and that the new proposal can be a move towards adjusting regulation to current 
market practices.  
Surprisingly, our interviews reveal that the VAR analysis is less common than we have been led to 
believe. This applies not just to investment and pension funds, but to banks as well. In fact, some banks 
have reported that they do not use VAR models, nor is it their intention to use them in the future. In their 
view, these models have no real application. A banker went further to say that VAR ‘could even distract 
. . . from what matters’. If these interviews are representative, this would mean that VAR models are not 
as responsible for volatility as has been believed. This was pointed out by Persaud and the LSE Financial 
Markets Group (see above). However, if VAR is pushed by the regulators, then it is possible that volatility 
may intensify.  
A major international bank investing and lending in emerging markets reported that it assesses 
country risk based on qualitative analysis, and for that purpose draws on various pieces of information 
relating to the country’s economic and political structures. In addition, it has its own rating system to 
quantify economic and political information and arrive at a country risk score. Other banks also have their 
own rating system, constructed on the basis of economic variables, and in which political variables are also 
used as inputs. 
Investment and pension funds, for their part, use a wide variety of models for the purpose of risk 
management, some of which are similar to VAR.  
For example, a fund manager informed us that his investment fund uses a dynamic risk model (as 
opposed to the more static models), which bears little resemblance to the VAR model. The purpose of 
this fund’s model is to offer a range of possible outputs in terms of tracking errors. This is possible 
because the fund does not attempt to beat a specific index. In other words, ‘they do not want to have a 
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tracking error target’, which means that this fund behaves differently from the more common balanced 
managed funds. A balanced fund manager, on the other hand, reported that he assesses risk using a model 
similar to the VAR. The idea is to assess what returns would be in the event of failure. 
Another fund manager informed us that they use their own in-house models; one example is the risk 
assessment model, which requires quantification of a wide range of variables such as solvency, liquidity, 
vulnerability, socio-economic fragility, governance, transparency, politics, etc.  
So far, what emerges from the above is, first, that the decision-making process is complex, consisting 
of different phases, each of which deals with specific issues (e.g. allocation, risk management); moreover, 
different actors are involved in the process (e.g. consultants, managers, specialised consultants, clients). 
This complexity poses difficult dilemmas to policy-makers, as it is not clear where to target their 
intervention in order to change behaviour patterns so that more funds are channelled to developing 
countries. Second, in each phase of the decision-making process, systematic forms of assessment are often 
employed; these can be quantitative and/or qualitative. And third, there is no homogeneity within or 
across classes of investors and lenders, in terms of the models they use. More importantly, few of them 
claim to use VAR models. Each uses a specific model, and the choice seems to be more related to the 
firm’s history (and culture) of asset allocation and management risk, than to the nature of the business in 
question.  
Having said that, homogeneity can be found in the basic principle underlying the portfolio allocation 
process; for example, the use of a mean-variance analysis seems to serve as a basic guideline to different 
portfolio investors. Econometric work conducted by Disyatat and Gelos (2001) shows that mean-variance 
optimisation is an important factor in explaining how dedicated emerging market funds manage their 
portfolios over time, although benchmark-following behaviour plays an even more important role. 
In addition to risk-assessment activities, investors and especially banks have been adopting risk-
management practices that increasingly include the use of hedging. International banks are at present 
hedging the total capital that goes to a specific country. The purpose is to protect them against exchange-
rate risk, which has become a major source of concern since the EM currency crises of the late 1990s. 
According to a banker, hedging takes place equally in countries with fixed and floating exchange regimes 
and is achieved through, for example, holding dollar-linked government bonds.  
Among investors other than FDI, hedging is less common. According to a consultant, in the case of 
pension funds, foreign exchange risk is seen as a major concern, but hedging this risk, though permitted, is 
seen as somewhat complex. A further problem is that some hedging practices may be interpreted as 
“trading”, and therefore may be taxed.  
Hedging is an important risk-management practice to highlight, given its major macroeconomic 
implications. First, the widespread use of hedging by lenders and investors may result in lower net inflows 
to developing countries. And second, when a crisis threatens, it may lead to major outflows, which can 
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exacerbate a country’s foreign exchange problems and contribute to triggering a currency crisis.27 These 
possible developments pose a major challenge to policy-makers in developing countries, as it is difficult to 
avoid them or to cope with their potentially destabilising effects. 
 
8  Degree of risk aversion 
As suggested above, hedging is a risk-management practice that has been adopted increasingly by lenders 
and investors dealing with emerging markets in response to the volatility of exchange rates associated with 
the frequency of international financial crises. More generally, hedging has been undertaken in response to 
increased risk aversion.  
Increased risk aversion has been associated with a deterioration in investor perception of what 
emerging markets can offer in terms of returns and risk. As a fund manager sees it, in the emerging 
markets ‘the decade of the 1990s was characterised by two halves: a first half of high returns and low 
assets’ correlation, and a second half of low returns and high correlation’. In addition, a further concern 
that has been repeatedly mentioned by all types of investor is the lack of liquidity in emerging markets. 
This change in perception has affected all types of investor and the way they look at the different 
asset categories. On the whole, the response to increased perceived risk by investment and pension funds 
has been a retreat from emerging markets, and amongst those remaining in emerging markets, a shift from 
emerging equities to emerging bonds. The response by banks, in turn, has been in the form of reduced 
cross-border lending to emerging markets. At the same time, they have acquired domestic banks in these 
markets, which have been on offer at relatively low prices. This contributed to an increase in within-
country lending.  
As regards investors, their response to increased perceived risk (which can be regarded as a cyclical 
phenomenon) has come in the form of structural changes in the nature of investment funds. The EM 
crises of the late 1990s have led to a significant reduction in investment funds specialising exclusively in 
emerging markets; at the same time, global investment funds have taken over the role of investing in EMs. 
To the extent that the latter have less knowledge of developing countries, this may have had a negative 
impact on such countries, in terms of volume of flows and their volatility. 
A further possible change in connection with increased risk perception and risk aversion (for a given 
level of risk) refers to a growing preference for index-tracking funds as opposed to balanced managed 
funds or even total return funds. This seems to be due to increased fear of underperforming, given the 
context of higher uncertainty surrounding returns and risks.  
In this new context of increased risk aversion, how much has the role of information changed 
regarding investors’ and lenders’ decision-making processes? 
 
                                                          
27  See Dodd (2001) for an analytical discussion of hedging activities and their macroeconomic impact; see also 
Moguillansky (2001) on hedging by multinational corporations in Latin America. 
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9  The role of information 
It is not easy to define the precise role information has, or can have, in the decision-making process of 
lenders and investors. In a previous paper, Gottschalk (2001a) observes that investors claim they attach 
high importance to information, but also argues that in crucial moments of the investment decision 
process, information tends to have a rather marginal role. This is because in such a process performance 
assessment is the variable that matters. Performance assessment is usually based on how close an investor 
gets to a pre-established target, set in turn in relation to a specific benchmark index. Given that investors 
do not want to deviate too much from their benchmarks (as the penalties for that are very high), 
information ends up having little room to influence the decision-taking process.  
However, the story is somewhat more complex. As seen earlier, decision-taking can be observed in 
different phases of the investment cycle: in general portfolio allocation, security selection, and market 
timing. Apparently, market timing is the phase in which balanced fund managers and index trackers, which 
constitute the majority of investors, face the most binding constraints. However, relatively more room for 
considering alternative investment choices seems available in portfolio allocation and security selection 
phases when, therefore, information can play a more important role. 
Our interviews reveal that as risk perception and risk aversion went up following the crises of the late 
1990s, lenders and investors started investing more in acquiring and systematising information about 
developing countries, that could be used in qualitative and/or quantitative analysis. This did not imply, 
however, employing more research analysts but, as put by a fund manager, having the same analyst 
covering more ground, in terms of sectors and countries. Given the reduction in the number of dedicated 
emerging market funds, the total net result has been less people collecting and analysing developing 
country information, not more. This is not good as it takes time to re-build expertise in developing 
countries. 
An international bank that undertakes qualitative analysis using a wide range of information reported 
that it intends to design a new model that will take into account the following broad areas: transfer risk; 
domestic/economic environment; financial sector environment; and political environment. The latter 
includes corporate governance and rules of law. In order to make their model feasible, they are looking for 
information on Codes and Standards (C&S). Their expectation is that such information can be made 
available in a quantifiable way. 
For policy purposes, though, developing countries may see that as a problem. Officials in developing 
countries fret about market demands for quantifiable C&S information. They believe that this information 
will prove harmful if the markets start to judge and compare sovereign and corporate risks using scores, as 
seems already to be the case. In their view, this would mean oversimplifying the complex C&S process 
that is aimed at achieving greater transparency (Gottschalk 2001b). 
The banks’ interest in C&S information contrasts with the more general market indifference to C&S. 
It would be interesting to know whether the banks’ interest in C&S reflects an emerging trend within the 
markets or whether it is just an isolated phenomenon. This is an important issue from the policy 
25 
perspective, given that developing countries have been strongly encouraged to invest heavily in 
implementing C&S of international best practice, with the promise that by doing so they may be rewarded 
by the markets. 
As regards information sources, some investors have in-house research. Others rely on outside 
sources of information, including outside consultants, academics and international organisations like the 
IMF. Some investors cultivate contacts with policy-makers and also travel to an area of potential 
investment in order to have a more accurate idea of that area’s real problems.  
A fund manager also noted that the EM investment community constitutes another key source of 
information. The community is relatively small, and therefore everybody knows who the major players are 
(amongst investment funds, hedge funds and local investors) and what assets they own. This enables them 
to detect their peers’ intentions, in terms of buying or selling a specific asset of a given EM country, and 
therefore anticipate the impact of their intended actions on the asset’s price.28  
More available information may be helping investors to discriminate amongst EM countries, with 
less contagion happening as a result. However, from the perspective of the country under severe scrutiny 
by the investment community, too much information may prove counter-productive and anticipate a 
crisis. This is the opposite of what one would expect – that investor awareness of potential problems early 
on could induce a country to take corrective action in order to avoid a crisis. 
According to our interviews, all types of lenders and investors seem to take due account of 
information during the different phases of the investment-decision process. However, momentum 
investors usually focus their attention on prices analysis, while investors that follow contrarian strategies 
do seem to hold a more solid information base and rely more heavily on fundamental analysis in their 
decision-making process.  
International banks, in turn, should be seen as a category apart. In normal times, for the purpose of 
lending they assess country information carefully (and benefit from information their affiliates can provide 
on EM countries). Thus, their actions are more similar to those of contrarian investors. However, the 
crises of the late 1990s have shown that in moments of distress they seem more prone to herding 
behaviour, thus acting like momentum investors. Nonetheless, Fraga and Gleiser (2001), based on their 
experience with Brazil’s crisis in 1999, argue that if bank creditors are provided with accurate and credible 
information about a country’s situation and crisis-management strategy, and about the intentions of other 
banks, a stampede to the exit door can be altogether avoided.  
Finally, it is important to address the following issue. Increased flows of information may indirectly 
contribute to herding, through lenders’ and investors’ risk-management activities. That is, information 
(provided in large quantities and at high frequency) may induce lenders and investors to adopt quantitative  
                                                          
28  Analogous to Keynes’ beautiful contest story. 
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techniques to manage risk. If they all tend to adopt similar techniques, due to new regulations such as the 
proposed Basle II, which wants to encourage the use of VAR models, our interviewees agree that herding 
behaviour could be intensified (see discussion above). 
 
10  Herding behaviour 
However, as seen earlier, our interviews reveal that lenders and investors diverge quite considerably in the 
techniques they use to manage risk. Thus, other factors may still be more important to explain herding. 
Most analysts seem to agree, and our interviews confirm, that a major factor underlying herding is 
performance assessment and its frequency. This is because the penalty it imposes on an investor erring 
alone is much higher than on that imposed on groups of investors acting collectively. In the case of erring 
alone, the penalty may come in the form of a job loss. But the penalty may go beyond that. Legal 
constraints may further exacerbate the problem. As the Unilever case has recently demonstrated (see 
above), fund managers can be sued for underperforming, or not meeting targets. 
An additional factor that at present contributes to herding is increased risk aversion amongst lenders 
and investors. As mentioned earlier, risk aversion has increased as a result of the crises of the late 1990s, 
especially the Russian crisis. As one investor put it,  
 
the Russian experience taught many investors that when there is a problem in a country, you simply 
abandon it entirely, and explain to your clients immediately that the country in question could be a 
repeat of Russia. In this way, clients do not blame you if you underperform relative to an index.  
 
Moreover, investors argue that a further reason for panic today is the lack of a lender of last resort. Thus, 
today, if a country is facing difficulties, investors will simply pull out. The consequences of their actions, 
however, will be that spreads will go up sharply and then banks will cut their credit lines and pull out as 
well. This spreads contagion across different actors, a phenomenon already observed during the Asian 
crisis (see Gottschalk and Griffith-Jones, 2003). 
Finally, in addition to peer pressure, performance criteria and legal threats, human psychology may 
play an important role in determining herding (see discussion above). 
 
11  Constraints on investing in EMs 
This section complements previous discussion of the possible constraints affecting investment in 
developing countries, and which inhibit capital flows to these countries despite the promised benefits of 
international portfolio diversification.  
For all types of lender and investor, today’s low returns and high risks constitute the main problem 
for lending to, and investing in, emerging markets. These reflect, at least in part, the economic downturn 
the global economy is experiencing, and the corresponding slow growth prospects amongst most 
emerging market economies. 
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Other macroeconomic factors concerning EM economies that have inhibited capital flows to them 
are lack of investor confidence in the policies pursued and in their sustainability. Nowadays, investors 
express caution about countries that adopt rigid exchange rate regimes (in the pre-East Asian crisis period 
they would have probably expressed the opposite view). On the political front, concerns include election 
cycles, lack of good governance, and so on. 
As regards EM capital markets, the main problems international investors face relate to lack of 
liquidity and size of the market. As some financial market analysts put it, ‘liquidity is key’, and in emerging 
markets, ‘there are some liquidity holes’.29  
At the regulatory level, a constraint that affects portfolio flows are the limits to OECD pension fund 
investment abroad. For example, German pension funds face upper limits for investing in non-EU 
equities and bonds of 6 and 5 per cent; and Switzerland and Sweden impose limits on foreign assets of 30 
per cent and 5–10 per cent, respectively (Davis 2002: Table 7). However, these types of restrictions are 
not generalised amongst OECD countries. Countries such as the US, UK and Japan impose no 
restrictions on foreign investment.  
Other regulatory constraints that affect UK pension funds in particular, are the recently implemented 
Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) and the new accounting standard FRS17, introduced to encourage 
a closer matching of assets and liabilities. Because these regulations compare assets and liabilities at a given 
point in time, they may be inhibiting risk-taking and portfolio diversification (see Kimmis et al. 2002). 
In addition to the general constraints mentioned thus far, the interviews have also made clear that 
each category of flows – equities, bonds and lending –faces specific problems at present. 
As regards equities, an important structural change that has been mentioned earlier is that companies 
in EMs are raising capital in New York and other stock exchanges through ADRs and GDRs. Although 
this is in itself a mechanism to attract foreign flows, it contributes to emptying local stock exchanges. 
Moreover, big companies have already been acquired by foreign capital, so investors think there are only a 
few companies left that can offer adequate risk/return characteristics; and in East Asia in particular, many 
companies are still family-controlled. A further structural change that is affecting equity flows to emerging 
markets concerns the trend, pointed out above, towards the increasing predominance of global funds and 
a decline in exclusively dedicated funds. Global funds are in search of liquidity – a key problem in EMs as 
just mentioned – and suffer from information asymmetry. These factors tend to make such funds focus 
on big markets in detriment to the emerging markets.30 
In relation to what is nowadays known as Codes and Standards (C&S), investors point to 
information  asymmetries,   poor  corporate  governance  and  levels  of  disclosure,  and  poor  settlement 
                                                          
29  Persaud (2001) presents an interesting analysis of possible causes of liquidity holes in emerging markets, in 
which the current trend in international capital markets towards lack of diversity amongst investors is 
highlighted (see further below). 
30  These funds, of course, also invest in bonds. 
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systems as obstacles to investing in emerging market equities. With specific reference to corporate 
governance, legislation is unfavourable to minority shareholders’ rights. 
As regards bonds, investors claim that lack of a lender of last resort, the official sector inclination 
towards supporting PSI initiatives and orderly debt workouts are factors that can potentially negatively 
affect new flows to emerging markets. A further problem relates to liquidity. Investors normally avoid 
trading with bonds that are less than US$300 million when issued. This is a problem that particularly 
affects small countries.  
In the case of banks, a key regulatory issue is the Basle II proposal. International lenders agree with 
the view that although the level of bank lending to developing countries is already very low, such rules, if 
implemented, could crystallise this situation. 
Table 11.1 summarises the specific factors constraining lending to/investing in developing countries 
faced by different financial actors. 
 
Table 11.1 Lending to and investing in developing countries: constraints specific to 
different actors 
 Constraints on investing in EMs 
Pension funds Some OECD countries face restrictions on foreign 
investment; asset-liability structure. 
Global investment funds Lack of liquidity and information asymmetry. 
Dedicated investment 
funds 
Problems with investing in EM stock markets that 
increasingly lack depth and breadth. 
Banks Problems with personal security. 
 
Source: interview material. 
 
Finally, in addition to the constraints affecting investment in EMs, investors see specific problems 
regarding poor countries. These include acute lack of liquidity, lack of companies in which to invest and 
problems with personal security. The latter was a factor mentioned by various interviewees. Furthermore, 
poor countries suffer from ‘information failure’ more acutely than medium-income developing countries 
do. Lack of information that can be appropriately quantified by potential investors is seen as an additional 
deterrent to investment in this category of country. In India – a large poor country and a major recipient 
of investment – an investor mentioned problems including continuing restrictions on foreign capital and 
taxes on capital gains.  
Discussing the possible constraints faced by investors in poor countries, it is really important to 
understand why sub-Saharan Africa, comprising a large number of poor countries, is perceived as having 
been largely unaffected by international capital flows. The question, to which we now turn, is whether this 
perception is accurate and, to the extent that it is, what the constraints are that inhibit greater lending and 
investing in the region. 
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12  Capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa 
Recent research indicates that private capital flows to the region during the 1990s were considerably 
greater than believed (after the crises of the late 1990s some decline has been observed). Part of this gap 
between perception and reality is explained by the inadequacy of data published by international 
organisations, that has been obtained from national sources and which underestimate capital flows to the 
region (Bhinda, Griffith-Jones, Leape and Martin 1999). Data gathered by senior officials of selected sub-
Saharan African countries show that these flows were much greater. In any case, overall data information, 
whether national or international, indicates that capital inflows to some countries amounted to 10–15 per 
cent of their GDP at some points during the last decade, having a significant impact on their economies.  
 
If it is true that substantial capital has flown to sub-Saharan Africa, what can explain this 
phenomenon?  
As regards portfolio equity flows, push factors have been identified as important in explaining the flows to 
Africa in the 1990s, particularly the decline in the US interest rate and the cyclical downturn in developed 
countries (see Bhinda et al. 1999). That is, investors searched for higher returns through portfolio 
diversification. Moreover, shares in these countries were seen as undervalued, which increased expected 
returns and compensated for perceived higher risks. A further reason for investing in these countries’ 
stock exchanges was that these markets were seen as bearing a relatively low correlation with developed 
markets, certainly much lower than the correlation between developed countries’ markets and those of 
Latin America and other developing regions. However, as argued above, as flows increase, correlation is 
expected to move up as well, as the degree of stock volatility returns. Thus, in so far as the region 
becomes more integrated into the world capital markets, some of the factors that had attracted flows to 
the region may disappear.  
Perceptions of the region vary considerably among investors (Bhinda et al. 1999). Dedicated fund 
managers are generally better informed, whereas global ones have rather volatile perceptions, being 
euphoric in good times (e.g. positive performance in stock exchanges) and very pessimistic in bad times. 
An interesting point is that as investors diversify their portfolio, they have less information to support 
their decisions (Calvo and Mendoza 1995, cited by Bhinda et al. 1999). This is mentioned as a cause for 
less investment in the region. As seen above, the business literature supports this hypothesis. In addition, 
managers are subject to short-term assessments (every three months), which works as a disincentive to 
invest in the region, since its economic volatility is perceived as higher, jeopardising short-term returns 
and therefore performance. 
 
What about the role of national factors in affecting the investment decision process? 
Table 12.1 displays the national factors (compiled by Bhinda et al. 1999) that are seen by investors as 
important in their decision-making process. They range from purely economic factors, such as growth 
performance and exchange rate prospects, to institutional factors such as private ownership, to more 
political ones (e.g. political stability). 
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Table 12.1 National factors underlying investor behaviour in sub-Saharan Africa 
Macro Structural Institutional Sectoral  Political Others 
Growth 
performance; 
other 
macroeconomic 
variables; 
economic policy 
co-ordination; 
exchange rate 
prospects. 
Soundness of 
domestic 
financial 
system; 
regional 
economic 
integration; 
availability of 
natural 
resources; 
transport and 
telecom 
networks. 
Private 
ownership; 
common 
regional 
regulation and 
supervision in 
banking; 
development of 
stock 
exchanges. 
Low cost, 
volume-
driven 
primary 
sectors. 
Political 
stability. 
Levels of 
corruption; 
bureaucracy; 
motivated 
labour force; 
donor support 
for portfolio 
investment. 
 
Source: author’s elaboration, based on Bhinda et al. (1999). 
 
Table 12.2 Factors inhibiting lending to and investing in developing countries 
Factors related to: 
Supply-side Prohibition of the use of instruments that may facilitate portfolio 
diversification (e.g. derivatives); slow-moving governance structure 
of funds; industry restrictions on investment abroad; performance 
assessment based on domestic benchmarks; regulatory constraints.  
Information  Information asymmetry; predominance of global funds (which suffer 
particularly from information asymmetry); insufficient information for 
forecasting and analysis; cost of information; information 
comparability. 
Risk Perception of low returns and high risks since the Asian crisis; 
currency risk; sources of risk: shallow markets; lack of liquidity; high 
level of concentration; multitude of existing financial instruments; 
risk between home and foreign assets assessed differently. 
Costs Cost of international management; international custodian costs; 
commission and transaction costs. 
Psychological Home bias; investors’ overconfidence. 
Host country factors  Lack of confidence in policies and their sustainability; rigid exchange 
rates; election cycles; lack of good governance; market 
characteristics (patterns of share ownership); degree of government 
regulations; tax effects. 
Equity-specific Emptying local stock exchanges (due to companies raising capital 
through ADRs and GDRs); few companies left following privatisation; 
family-controlled firms (esp. in East Asia); C&S-related (poor 
corporate governance and levels of disclosure; poor settlements 
systems; legislation biased against minority shareholders’ rights).  
Bonds-specific Lack of lender of last resort; official sector inclination towards 
supporting PSI initiatives and orderly debt workouts; liquidity-related 
(avoiding trading with bonds that are less than US$300 million when 
issued). 
Investment Banks-
specific 
Lack of lender of last resort; PSI initiatives and orderly debt 
workouts; problems with personal security; Basle II: may crystallise 
low levels of lending. 
Poor country-specific Acute lack of liquidity; lack of companies to invest in; acute 
‘information failure’; lack of information that can be quantified; 
personal security. 
 
Source: the business literature (see Part I); interview material and Bhinda et al. (1999). 
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12.1 Bank lending 
Bank lending to the region has been mainly associated with the presence of foreign banks. In the case of 
short-term and medium-term lending, the level of risk involved and the existence of risk-mitigation 
mechanisms have been key in explaining these flows to the region. For example, short-term lending has 
been linked to better export performance; medium-term lending, in turn, has been made possible with 
reduced risk through guarantees and co-financing by IFIs (WB, IFC, EIB). FDI involvement in a project 
is pointed out as another important risk-reducing factor.  
On the other hand, important factors deterring lending are: provisioning guidelines banks have to 
follow; the fact that export credit agencies have suspended guarantees against non-repayment of loans in 
most of SSA since the 1980s; and the external debt burden.31 
Table 12.2 summarises all the factors mentioned in the literature review, the interviews and in this 
section that may have been inhibiting lending to and investing in developing countries, including the 
poorest ones. 
 
13  Summary and policy recommendations for lending and investing 
more in EMs 
This section summarises some of the findings reported in this study and attempts to outline a set of policy 
proposals aimed at encouraging more capital flows to developing countries. 
A key finding that deserves further analysis is the fact that investor behaviour is not so homogeneous 
as we have been led to believe. Diversity can be found among investors, between investors and lenders, 
and among lenders as well. According to our interviews, even the same investment house adopts different 
investment strategies within different investment divisions. How does this fit with our pre-conceived idea 
that investors behave very similarly?  
As we have seen, the decision-making process is complex, consisting of different phases – asset 
allocation, security selection and risk management. These phases together comprise what we call here the 
“investment cycle”. During the first two phases of the investment cycle, diversity in investment behaviour 
may be indeed the case. Moreover, this diversity may have had positive, though limited, implications for 
developing countries. In normal times, some lenders and investors seem to have been inclined to invest in 
such countries more than others, through an allocation process in which alternative investment choices 
are considered and information can play an important role.  
However, in times characterised by high uncertainty, lender and investor behaviour tends to 
converge very rapidly, particularly in their risk-management activities. This convergence takes place not 
only  within  the  same  categories  of  financial  player,  but  across  different  categories  of  player.  Thus, 
                                                          
31  Annex Table A.1 summarises the recent characteristics of different types of player. 
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although some degree of diversity may also be found during the risk-management phase, this diversity 
collapses and is replaced with herding behaviour – a key factor underlying financial crises in developing 
countries.  
This leads us to the issue of information. During periods of high uncertainty, which may lead to 
herding, the role of information tends to become very limited (although some investors may argue that it 
may be useful in discriminating between countries, and this could help reduce contagion effects). This is 
because risk-management systems tend to collapse in the face of uncertainty and, as a result, information, 
which is a key input to such systems, becomes irrelevant.  
In normal times, information seems to have ambiguous effects. On the one hand, information can 
have a very positive role, when it is used to inform lenders and investors in their allocation and security 
selection process. Given that the lack of information (which leads to problems of information 
asymmetry), and in particular the cost of information, have been highlighted as major contributors to 
limited portfolio diversification towards developing countries, providing information about these 
countries could effectively promote the channelling of lending and investment funds to them.  
On the other hand, the use of information may turn out to be problematic. An increase in the 
availability of information, which has been amply encouraged as a way to reduce the occurrence of crises 
in developing countries, may actually accelerate a crisis. It could even contribute to the occurrence of a 
crisis that could perfectly well have been avoided. This hypothesis, which is not confirmed by a recent 
study by Gelos and Wei (2002),32 should be investigated further.  
Moreover, to the extent that information becomes available on a continuous basis (e.g. high 
frequency data), it may make possible the use of VAR techniques that could not be used before due to 
lack of quantifiable information. The generalised use of similar techniques may intensify herding. Again, 
this is a crucial hypothesis that deserves further investigation. If true, it poses serious dilemmas for policy-
makers. While increasing the flow of information to markets may encourage the adoption of VAR models, 
it may well be the case that the markets will in any case adopt such models sooner or later, and those 
countries unable to provide information may be excluded from investors’ portfolios.  
Another important aspect of the decision-making process is that it involves various actors – 
investors, consultants, trustees, fund managers, analysts, and so forth. This poses a major challenge to 
policy-makers, as it is difficult to know whom to target in order to encourage more capital flows to 
developing countries. 
As regards the constraints on investing in developing countries, we have seen that, in addition to 
information, the obstacles to investing in such countries can be: country-specific (e.g. related to 
macroeconomic conditions, corporate governance, etc.), supply-side related (industry restrictions on 
overseas investment, investment performance based on domestic benchmarks); risk related (e.g. currency 
risk, different risk assessments for different countries, liquidity); and psychological in origin (home bias, 
                                                          
32  Gelos and Wei (2002) show that those countries most transparent (through the provision of information) are 
less likely to suffer a financial crisis. 
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overconfidence). Problems relating specifically to poor countries include lack of liquidity, lack of 
companies in which to invest, acute “information failure” and personal security issues. 
Drawing on the above, in what follows we provide a set of preliminary policy recommendations 
designed to encourage more private capital flows to developing countries, in addition to those already 
suggested in Part I. Some of these recommendations were discussed with financial market participants, 
and thus incorporate their suggestions for improvement. Others are drawn from the market participants 
themselves. 
Market participants emphasised the need for developing countries to promote sound macroeconomic 
policies; moreover, in their view it is important that these countries improve their legal and political 
systems. They put much emphasis on the need for the rule of law and corporate governance, and more 
business-friendly conditions. Although these recommendations are very important, in what follows our 
focus will be on those policy measures and initiatives that can be implemented in the source countries. 
As suggested earlier, taxation is one area that we believe should be addressed in order to encourage 
more private flows to developing countries and overcome psychological barriers such as “home bias”. For 
example, tax incentives could be offered to pension funds, and eventually to other investors. In the view 
of one fund manager – a view apparently shared by many others – these incentives would have to be 
generous to be effective. Therefore, more consultation is needed for the design of a scheme likely to have 
maximum impact. 
A further helpful measure might be the provision of guarantees, as a way to at least partially deal with 
the problem of risk, since this has been repeatedly mentioned by lenders and investors as a major barrier 
to investing in developing countries, especially the poorer ones. These guarantees could be provided in 
normal times to encourage flows to those countries that otherwise do not have access to international 
financial markets, and also at times of risk aversion. Providing guarantees in a context of high risk could 
help influence investors’ appetite for risk. As seen above, tackling risk aversion is crucial, as it has been a 
major factor behind the decline in flows to developing countries since the East Asian crisis. 
As seen earlier, a key problem discouraging investment in developing countries is lack of liquidity. In 
this regard, it is interesting to note that Persaud (2001) calls attention to the link between investor 
behaviour and the creation of liquidity holes in developing countries. He believes that this has to do with 
the fact that investors use similar models, leading them to act in similar ways in the face of changing 
circumstances in developing countries. If a negative event takes place, they may overreact collectively 
thereby creating acute liquidity problems in specific markets. He suggests international regulators should 
encourage more diversity in terms of the models used by investors. Each model could be tailored to 
investors’ specific needs, inducing them to react to given events in different ways. This, Persaud believes, 
could reduce the likelihood of market liquidity drying-up. 
Moreover, diversity in risk management should be encouraged in order to reduce herding, thereby 
helping to reduce the occurrence of financial crises in developing countries. More generally, diversity 
should be encouraged in all phases of the investment cycle. If diversity during the asset allocation phase 
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increases, developing countries would have a greater chance of access to capital flows, as some investors 
would be more inclined to invest in such countries.  
The measures just mentioned may be useful to different asset categories. In what follows, we will 
consider measures that would be useful to specific kinds of investor/categories of assets. 
In relation to bonds, one financial market participant suggested the creation of a Latin American 
Borrower Authority. It would be an entity that would pool countries of the LA region (of course, this idea 
could be also applied to other geographical areas), and would issue bonds on behalf of the member 
countries. These bonds would be issued at AA credit rating, and would be supported by collaterals. The 
authority would also be able to raise money in the international financial markets as an AA borrower, and 
thus lend to member countries at reasonable interest rates. In addition, the authority would be able to set 
limits on the amount of money a country could raise, in the form of bond-issuing or through borrowing, 
in order to avoid the excessive flows that tend to occur in good times. The authority would, of course, 
particularly benefit those countries too small to raise money in the international capital markets. The 
suggested authority would be very similar to existing institutions that have already proved successful in 
raising capital for a group of countries. The Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF) is a case in point. 
A regional approach could be also applied to equities. For example, several market participants 
suggested that developing countries should try to create regional stock exchanges. Some players, however, 
view this prospect with a degree of scepticism. They believe that the current trend towards increasing 
reliance on major stock exchanges based in developed countries is inevitable, and that it is hard to 
combine this with stock exchanges in developing countries. The latter would suffer greatly from acute 
liquidity problems – an issue of significant concern to investors. 
Given the current tendency to raise capital in developed countries’ stock markets, it might be helpful 
to make it easier for companies of a certain critical size to raise funds in developed stock markets. Local 
markets could be reserved for small companies. 
Finally, in light of the problems indicated throughout this paper concerning the constraints imposed 
on fund managers by benchmarks and the pressures they are under not to deviate too far from them, 
several policy recommendations to investors (particularly pension funds), follow. 
 
• Pension funds could change the way in which they look at the asset-liability match. Developing 
countries would particularly benefit from this change, because pension funds tend to have long-term 
liabilities, while developing countries can offer long-term rewards, even when the short-term gains 
look uncertain. 
• Given the power consultants hold at present, it would be important to try to influence them. 
Alternatively, as suggested in the Myners (2001) report, trustees could be trained to become more 
skilled in the investment management field (or to delegate their work to an expert); they should in 
particular learn about the benefits of diversification and of investing in developing countries, and 
give more long-term mandates. In addition, they should invest more in in-house research and set up 
investment sub-committees, as has already been done in one major UK pension fund (see above). 
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• One could draw on the idea of socially responsible investment (SRI) to propose something similar 
for developing countries. That is, institutional investors could be encouraged to invest in developing 
countries for moral and economic reasons, in the same way they may be encouraged to do so for 
social, ethical or environmental reasons. 
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Appendix: Interviewees’ institutions 
Place  Occupation/Institution 
London HSBC 
London State Street Bank 
London Bank of England 
New York JP Fleming Asset Management 
Boston Putnam Investments 
Chicago UBS Asset Management 
Newport Beach (PIMCO) 
New York (MSIM)  
New York Fidelity Management and Research 
London F&C Management 
London (IPMA) 
London Cross Border Capital 
London HSBC 
London BBVA 
New York Salomon Smith Barney (SSB) 
Reigate, UK Watson Wyatt 
New York JP Morgan Chase 
London JP Morgan Fleming Asset Management 
London American Express Bank (AMEX) 
London Rexeter 
London Rothschild Asset Management Limited 
London Barclays 
London Universities Superannuation Scheme Limited (USS) 
London Capital International 
London Mercer Investment Consulting 
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Annex 
 
Table A1 Lenders’ and investors’ recent traits 
 Lending/ 
investment 
strategy 
Allocation 
decision 
Degree of 
risk 
aversion 
Role of 
information 
Use of models Herding 
behaviour 
Constraints on investing in EMs 
Pension 
funds 
 
Contrarians 
 
 
Consultants 
play a major 
role 
Moderate   Important Little Below average Some OECD countries face restrictions 
on foreign investment 
Global 
invest-
ment 
funds 
 
Momentum 
strategies 
 
 
Top-down 
approach 
High Moderate Yes Yes Lack of liquidity and information 
asymmetry 
Dedicated 
invest-
ment 
funds 
 
Contrarians 
 
 
Bottom-up 
approach 
Moderate    Crucial Little Below average Tend to be equity investors that are 
facing problems in investing in EM 
stock markets that increasingly lack 
depth and breadth. 
Banks Increasing 
within-country 
lending and 
declining cross-
border lending 
Top-down 
approach 
High     Important Some do Yes Lack of lender of last resort; PSI 
initiatives and orderly debt workouts; 
problems with personal security 
 
Source: interview material. 
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